The Ownership and Industry Effects of Corporate Dividend Policy in India, 1961-2007
The dividend policy decision is regarded to be complex having implications for economy (macro level) and firm (micro level), as well. At the macro level it helps in formulating appropriate policies for achieving the national aggregate savings and sectoral distribution of those savings keeping in view the priorities of national credit plans as per Bhole (1980) and at the firm level, are crucial in taking investment and financial decisions according to Aurebach (1982) , Mahapatra (1996) , and Benito and Young (2001) . The relationship between type of ownership and nature of industry the firm represents sector membership with their capital structures and dividend policies have received considerable attention in literature. The type of industry and sector in which a firm operates is likely to have a significant effect on its financing and dividend behavior. Harris and Raviv (1991) state that firms in a given industry have similar proportions of individual assets and liabilities while studies by Bowen et. al., (1982) , Bradley et. al., (1984) and Kester (1986) find that specific industries have common financial characteristics and are relatively stable over time. Richardson et. al., (2002) on the other hand confirm that the industry affiliation is a strong determinant of corporate cash holdings, acquisitions, R&D, capital expenditures, leverage, dividends and share repurchase policy.
The prior research on relationship between industry and dividend policies are mostly focused on dividend behavior of public limited and non-financial corporations with reference to developed capital markets alone. Similar work analyzing variation of dividends across industry groups and over time in the emerging market context is rare. Present study is an attempt to fill the gap and investigates empirically cross-sectional trends and specific shifts in corporate dividend patterns in India over the last four decades. The evidence and plausible explanations of changing dividend behavior and their earnings at an aggregate ownership; i.e.
closely / largely held and regulated firms, and at disaggregate (PLCs across 20 industries) level are presented. Specifically it is looked at the extent to which a firm's observed dividend policy is similar to others across ownership types (Public Limited, Private Limited and This remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and specifies time-trend models. Results and interpretations of the analysis are presented in section 2 whereas, section 3 concludes.
Data and Model Specifications
For purpose of analysis the data from Reserve Bank of India (RBI), emerging from two different dataset compilations namely the published data compendium by on the 'Private Corporate Business Sector in India -Selected Financial Statistics from 1950-51 to 1997-98 (All Industries)', and published compendium on 'Selected Financial Statistics on Public Limited Companies 1974 -75 to 1999 -2007 ' consisting of industry level data respectively. In order to determine the differences in cash dividend and earnings behavior of the (PLCs), private limited (PVLCs) and finance companies (FINCs), we use the former source consisting data from 1950-51 to 1997-98 and various issues of the RBI bulletins to cover data for the balance periods on above three sub-sectors, at an all industry level. The average number of firms in sample, along with study year from which they are drawn is appended in table 1 (in Appendix). The cash dividend behavior relating PLCs, PVLCs, and the FINCs for all firms in dataset and the time period under consideration is forty-three years, 1961 through 2007 whereas the industry effects relating PLCs are analyzed for all the firms in the dataset for twenty-five years, 1976 through 2007. We divide the entire time-period into pre-reform period : 1961-1992 and 1976-1992 and the post-reform period 1993-2007 and 1993-2007 respectively, to capture the effect of policy break on the dividend decisions of firms. For the purpose of analysis of trends we consider only cash dividends (total dividends).
The variable size of earnings (SZEAR) is defined as total net profit after taxes after accounting for preference dividends is used as the earnings measure for equity dividends whereas profits after taxes (PAT) is the earnings measure for preference dividends. Both the earnings measures represent the profits available for appropriation to the share holders and preference holders respectively. Equity dividend payout ratio (EDPOR) and preference dividend payout ratio (PDPOR) is therefore given by total equity dividend (EQDIV) and preference dividend (PRFDIV) at the end of the year divided by SZEAR and PAT respectively. The equity return (EQRET) and preference return (PRFRET) are a function of respective dividends by the book value of the respective share capital, where the book value of shares includes bonus shares and shares issued for consideration other than cash.
The descriptive statistical tools are primarily used for analyzing the cross-sectional data. Annual sub-period averages across every five year period are computed to depict their changing behavior of dividends in the pre/post-reform and the full period. In order to compare the sub-group means across the cross section and over time we use non-parametric techniques for they do not assume equal variances. The Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) and Levene's Robust tests are calculated to detect normality and homogeneity of variance respectively. S-W test hypothesizes that the data are normally distributed, and a low significance value indicate that the distribution of the data differs significantly from a normal. The Levene statistic tests hypothesis of equality of variance of the dependent variable for groups defined by categorical factor variables and is an alternative to the Bartlett test that is less sensitive to departures from normality. This tests the null hypothesis of equality of variance of the dependent variable for groups defined by categorical factor variables. In order to test whether two independent samples (groups) come from the same population, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S statistic) is used. The K-S test is based on the maximum absolute difference between the observed cumulative distribution functions for both samples. When this difference is significantly large, the two distributions are considered to be different. The Kruskal Wallis-H (KW-H) test for several independent samples is used to detect the differences in distribution location, is an extension of Mann-Whitney U test and a nonparametric alternative to one-way ANOVA. In the KW-H test, the scores are ranked without regard to group membership. If the groups do not differ, the mean ranks will be similar to each other. The instantaneous growth rate, compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) and the linear trend are computed using semi-log (log-lin) and Linear trend model respectively for the full time period, pre and post-liberalization period are computed. The instantaneous (constant) growth and the CAGR's is given as as follows. 
Where X i and Y i records time and the independent variable under study respectively. Assuming that ( ) 0,
which are, respectively, the mean functions for pre-reform and post-reform periods and β is statistically significant, we may accept the hypothesis that the two regressions have the same intercept that is the two regressions are concurrent.
The time trend for the full period and for the pre-reform and the post-reform period using dummies are computed using the following linear trend models respectively. 
Results and Interpretations
The results are presented in two parts, the Ownership and Regulated Industry effects and secondly the Inter-and Intra-Industry effects. The former follows first.
Ownership and Regulated Industry Effect
The descriptive statistics across the PLCs, the PVLCs and FINCs relating the dividend returns and dividend payout ratio over time are presented in table 2 and 3 respectively. For all periods the average equity dividend return with a range of 7-14 % earned by equity holders is twice that of preference holders, across all type of companies. However the variability in case of preference return is lower in all quinquenniums indicating relatively higher stability compared to equity return. Share holders of PLCs gained higher returns in post-reform periods compared to the former. Across all type of companies, the equity and the preference dividend returns in the post-reform period has declined compared to pre-reform periods. For post-reform period the equity return for PLCs increase significantly by 7%. The equity and preference return of PLCs followed by that of PVLCs and the highly regulated, FINCs are largest across both sub-periods and also in the full period under study. emerges from above discussion is in tandem with the fact that the dividend payments are higher where there are dispersed outsiders with little leverage over the insiders as long as the firm is in continuous need of equity capital and thus forces to them to return to the capital markets. In general, firms with sizeable "outside" financing such as common equity are subject to agency costs of managerial discretion and with no dominating share holders, managers have incentives to use cash dividends to convey information about the firms' future performance.
The incentive to pay cash dividends declines as the shareholder concentration declines and supports Agency Cost hypothesis which begun with the work of Donaldson (1961 Donaldson ( , 1963 and Easterbrook (1984) , suggesting dividends can help reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control which occurs in companies. When the ownership of the company is highly diversified, individual investors have few incentives to control the actions of managers and if they do so, results in high cost for the company. In such a framework outsiders may prefer a high dividend policy with a view, better a dividend today than a highly uncertain capital gain from questionable future investment. La Porta et. al., (2000) show that a closely held firm does not need to increase its dividend or take on more debt to signal to insiders the higher quality of its earnings. In a similar study Yurtoglu (2000) describes the main characteristics of ownership structure of the Turkish companies listed on the Istanbul stock exchange and show that concentrated ownership and pyramidal structures have a negative effect on performance. Kalay and Michaely (2000, 2002) argue that asymmetric information and agency considerations are likely to be more severe in public rather than private firms. For a privately held firm it would be easier to transmit information through other vehicles, and easier to monitor managers, to prevent them from excessive spending. Hence the consequences of reducing dividends may be more severe for public firms and no difference is expected in case of financial firms. Public firms consequently are reluctant to reduce dividends. For China, Lee and Xiao (2003) that the regulated firms give managers the incentive to pay higher dividends to force them to raise funds more frequently in the capital market. This is probably since regulated firms are more matured than the unregulated firms; managers have no much freedom to make them grow as significant difference in percentage of common stock held by insiders. Studies like that of Smith (1986) hypothesize that the regulated firms have a restricted growth prospects, restricted geography, product market, earnings etc. and the regulators act as delegated monitors of firm behavior, reducing considerably the wasteful investments engagements by managers or private consumption of the available FCF leading to more dividend distribution. Saxena (1999) finds that the mean DPRs for the regulated firms are larger than that of unregulated firms as these firms are less risky, have lower growth rates, much few insiders' holdings in its common stock and fewer investment opportunities. Regulation in case of such firms effectively reduces the possibility for corporate under-investment simply by transferring much of management's discretion over investment's decision to regulatory authorities.
Similarly, Barclay et. al,. (1995) notes that the regulated industries have higher leverage ratios and pay higher dividends than unregulated corporations whereas, Collins et. al., (1996) also find that the payout ratios for the financial firms and utilities are significantly larger than that for unregulated sample firms.
Inter and Intra-Industry Effects
The In post-reform periods compared to the former, the K-W statistics reported in table 13 indicates that decrease in means of various dividend related variables for the select industries under study are sizeable and significant. Overall results imply the changing (decreasing) pattern of dividend behaviour across the inter and intra-industry cross-section during the study periods. The present study on ownership and industry effects of dividends suggests that the aggregate data at corporate sector level provide a useful and interesting perspective on the sectoral differences in dividend policies and their relationship with other earning variables, but masks many of the industry-specific behavior dominating dividend decisions. To capture such effects, we look at the dividend behavior of individual industries in which the firm operates. It is found that the dividend policies followed by the regulated industry are significantly larger then the un-regulated private and public firms. Further, the dividend payments are higher where there are dispersed outsiders and the incentive to pay cash dividends therefore declines as the shareholder concentration declines. Dividend policies of Indian firms respond to informational asymmetries, agency costs, and the institutional and contracting environment it is in. Firms systematically differ across industry class so far as their earnings management is concerned. We find that industries with higher reported compounded growth in the earnings pay fewer dividends, firms in capital intensive industry pay more while those in the production / distribution sector pay fewer dividends. Though differences is firm size contributes to the existing variations in nominal dividend and dividend related ratio's across industry-classes, to some extent it is the stage of maturity or more precisely the differences in the corporate type, the industry size, their technology / labour orientation, need for cash, fragility of earnings and the general economic trends specific to industry-class contributes to the existing variation in dividend policies, but nature of the industry seems to dominate largely. The overall evidence also signals that there exists some linkage between the product and the capital market.
Summary and Findings
The Indian corporate sector pays relatively more equity dividends then preference dividends, and the average equity dividend return earned by equity holders is twice that of preference holders. Other things being equal, the probability of paying cash dividends decreases with the share holder concentration in India. Across all the three types of companies, the widely-held firms pay the largest and the closely-held firms relatively lower aggregate nominal rupee equity dividend payments in the pre/post-reform and the full period.
Private companies (closely held) are characterized by higher shareholding concentration compared to public limited companies, and other things being equal the probability of paying cash dividends, dividend returns and payout ratio decreases with shareholder concentration.
Most studies exclude regulated companies intentionally with a notion that their regulatory status may affect their dividend policies. We include financial companies as a proxy to study regulated industry effect and find that they pay relatively a larger proportion of their respective earnings to their equity and preference holders in the entire period. This and thus their payouts smooth earnings. In accordance with Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) industries differ with respect to maturity and information opacity, thus the degree of free cash flow problems and, consequently as Moh 'd et. al., (1995) prove empirically, payout ratios are likely to vary considerably across sectors.
More specifically, on analysis of inter-corporate and inter-industry variations in dividend policy for India it is found that dividends interplay differently with exogenous factors. It the differences in ownership concentration, external fund requirement based on technology, the type of the product they manufacture, the presence of growth opportunities via internal financing and the future earnings flows that they expect to generate, differences the inter-corporate, inter-industry variations in dividend policies. One important observation through the analysis on systematic cross-sectional pattern over a longer period of time is worth re-mentioning. The average dividend payout ratios for all type of companies (closelyheld, widely-held firms, and across industry cross-section) decline and such a tendency is more pronounced after the liberalization periods. Though this finding is based on aggregate level data the results are captivating and are in tandem with the recent evidence documenting dividend payments are disappearing, the world-over. Notes: EQDIV, PRFDIV, EQRET, PRFRET, SZEAR, PAT, EDPR, EDPR, and PDPR refers to Total Rupee value of cash equity dividend, Preference dividend, Equity return (dividends by the book value of the respective share capital), Preference return, Size of Earnings (net profit after taxes after accounting for preference dividends) as the earnings measure for equity dividend payments, Net profit after taxes as the earnings measure for preference dividend payments, Equity dividend payout ratio (dividend by respective measure of earnings) and Preference dividend payout ratio respectively. Source: Same as in Table 1 . A1 A2 A3 G1 G2 G3 A1 A2 A3 G1 G2 G3 A1 A2 A3 G1 G2 G3 A1 A2 A3 G1 G2 G3 Basic Chemical Asymp. Sig. 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.04** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
